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Abstract—We consider colorful bin packing games in which
selfish players control a set of items which are to be packed into
a minimum number of unit capacity bins. Each item has one of
m ≥ 2 colors and cannot be packed next to an item of the same
color. All bins have the same unitary cost which is shared among
the items it contains, so that players are interested in selecting a
bin of minimum shared cost. We adopt two standard cost sharing
functions: the egalitarian cost function which equally shares the
cost of a bin among the items it contains, and the proportional
cost function which shares the cost of a bin among the items it
contains proportionally to their sizes. Although, under both cost
functions, colorful bin packing games do not converge in general
to a (pure) Nash equilibrium, we show that Nash equilibria are
guaranteed to exist and we design an algorithm for computing
a Nash equilibrium whose running time is polynomial under the
egalitarian cost function and pseudo-polynomial for a constant
number of colors under the proportional one. We also provide
a complete characterization of the efficiency of Nash equilibria
under both cost functions for general games, by showing that the
prices of anarchy and stability are unbounded when m ≥ 3 while
they are equal to 3 for black and white games, where m = 2. We
finally focus on games with uniform sizes (i.e., all items have the
same size) for which the two cost functions coincide. We show
again a tight characterization of the efficiency of Nash equilibria
and design an algorithm which returns Nash equilibria with best
achievable performance.
Index Terms—Non-cooperative games, bin packing, Nash equi-
libria, price of anarchy, price of stability
I. INTRODUCTION
A classical problem in combinatorial optimization is the
one-dimensional bin packing problem, in which items with
different sizes in [0, 1] have to be packed into the smallest
possible number of unit capacity bins. This problem is known
to be NP-hard (see [8] for a survey).
The study of bin packing in a game theoretical context has
been introduced in [4]. In such a setting, items are handled by
selfish players and the unitary cost of each bin is shared among
the items it contains. In the literature, two natural cost sharing
functions have been considered. The egalitarian cost function,
used in [9], [18], which equally shares the cost of a bin among
the items it contains, and the proportional cost function, studied
in [4], [10], where the cost of a bin is split among the items
proportionally to their sizes. That is, each player is charged
with a cost according to the fraction of the used bin space her
item requires. We notice that for games with uniform sizes, i.e.,
when all the items have the same size s, the two cost functions
coincide. Each player would prefer to choose a strategy that
minimizes her own cost, where the strategy is the bin chosen
by the player. Pure Nash equilibria, i.e. packings in which
no player can lower her cost by changing the selected bin in
favor of a different one, are mainly considered as natural stable
outcomes for these games. The social cost function that we
aim to minimize is the number of open bins (a bin is open if
it stores at least one item). Bin packing games can be used to
model many practical scenarios, like for instance, bandwidth
allocations problems, packet scheduling problems, etc. (see [4],
[13]).
In this paper we consider colorful bin packing games, where
we are given a set of n selfish players, a set of m ≥ 2 colors,
and a set of n unit capacity bins. Players control indivisible
colored items of size in [0, 1]. Each item needs to be packed
into a bin without exceeding its capacity and in such a way
that no item is misplaced, that is no item is packed next to an
item of the same color. The special case of games with two
colors is called black and white bin packing games. We use
both the egalitarian and the proportional cost functions, where
we set the cost of any misplaced item as infinite, and adopt
Nash equilibria as stable outcomes of the games. Clearly, in
any Nash equilibrium no player can be charged with a infinite
cost, since, for any player, moving a misplaced item to an
empty bin (and thus getting cost 1) is always an improving
deviation. We notice that, if all the items have different colors,
these games correspond to the bin packing ones. However,
when there are items with the same color, the stable outcomes
of the games are structurally different than bin packing ones.
In fact, we show that in our games, Nash equilibria perform
very differently than in bin packing ones.
Colorful bin packing games generalize the bin packing games
and therefore model many practical scenarios and situations
where it is important distinguishing or separating the items, that
are not captured by bin packing games. For instance, suppose
that a shipping company rents out its means of transport like
trucks. Customers want to ship their items at the smallest cost.
For example, items could be chemical agents with different
characteristics or properties such that, if two items with the
same property are packed next to the other in the truck, they
could dangerously react. Colorful bin packing games can be
used to model such scenario. Items here correspond to chemical
agents, colors to characteristics, and bins to trucks. Other
interesting applications can be found in [6], [11].
Our Contribution. We first focus on the existence of Nash
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equilibria. We show that colorful bin packing games may not
converge to Nash equilibria. In fact, they may admit an infinite
sequence of improving deviations (i.e., the finite improvement
path property is not guaranteed) even for special cases in which
games have only two colors and uniform sizes (Proposition
3.1). In this case the egalitarian and proportional cost functions
coincide. However, in Theorems 3.2 and 3.3, we show that,
under both cost functions, if one allows the players to perform
only improving deviations towards bins in which no item
is misplaced, then any game possesses the finite improving
path property. As in any non-equilibrium profile there always
exists a player who possesses one such a deviation, and in
particular a misplaced item can always move to an empty
bin, it follows that Nash equilibria are guaranteed to exist
under both cost functions. We also show a very natural and
simple algorithm Algorithm 1 (a similar approach was already
considered in [10]), that computes a Nash equilibrium whose
running time is polynomial under the egalitarian cost function
and pseudo-polynomial for a constant number of colors under
the proportional one (Theorem 3.9).
We then measure the quality of Nash equilibria using the
standard notions of PoA (price of anarchy) and PoS (price of
stability), that are defined as the worst/best case ratio between
the social cost of a Nash equilibrium and the cost of a social
optimum, which corresponds to the minimum number of open
bin needed to feasibly pack all colored items. We provide a
complete characterization of the efficiency of Nash equilibria by
showing that, under both cost functions, the prices of anarchy
and stability of colorful bin packing games are unbounded
(we consider the absolute approximation ratio), when m ≥ 3
(Theorems 3.4 and 3.5), while they are equal to 3 when m = 2
(Theorems 4.2, 4.3, and 4.9). We also consider the basic setting
in which all items have the same size s and again provide a
complete picture of the efficiency of Nash equilibria which
happens to depend on the parity of the number κ = b1/sc
of items that can be packed into a bin without exceeding its
capacity (in this case the egalitarian and proportional cost
functions coincide). In particular, we show that, when κ is
even, the price of stability is 2 for any m ≥ 2 (Theorems 5.1
and 5.2), while the price of anarchy is 2 for m = 2 (Theorem
5.7), and unbounded for m ≥ 3 (Theorem 5.5). When κ is
odd, the price of stability is 1 for any m ≥ 2 (Theorem 5.2),
while the price of anarchy is 3 for m = 2 (Theorems 4.2 and
5.6), and unbounded for m ≥ 3 (Theorem 5.5). We also design
an algorithm (Algorithm 2) which returns a Nash equilibria
which is socially optimal when κ is odd and 2-approximates
the social optimal when κ is even.
Due to space constraints, some proofs have been removed.
All the details will appear in the full version of the paper.
Related Work. The classical one-dimensional bin packing
problem has been widely studied (see [8] for a general survey).
Bin packing games under the proportional cost function have
been introduced in [4]. The author proved the existence of
Nash equilibria by showing that the best-response dynamics
converge in finite time. He also established that there is always
a Nash equilibrium with minimal number of bins, i.e., the
PoS is 1, but that finding such a good equilibrium is NP-hard.
Finally, he presented upper and lower bounds on the PoA.
Nearly tight bounds on the PoA have been later shown in [13].
Yu and Zhang [19] have designed a polynomial time algorithm
which returns a Nash equilibrium. Bin packing games under the
egalitarian cost function were considered in [18]. They showed
tight bounds on the PoA and the PoS and design a polynomial
time algorithm for computing a Nash equilibrium. In [9], the
authors provided tight bounds on the exact worst-case number
of steps needed to reach a Nash equilibrium. Other types of
equilibria (like for instance strong equilibria) and other bin
packing games were also considered in [1], [7], [10], [12]–[14],
[16].
The offline version of the black and white bin packing
problem was considered in [3]. Most of the literature on
colorful bin packing is about the online version of the problem.
Competitive algorithms for the online colorful bin packing
problem were presented in [11]. The special case black and
white was considered in [2], while, the one where all items
have size 0, was considered in [5]. All such results on the
online version of the problem were improved in [6].
Related colorful bin packing problems have been also
considered. For instance, in the bin coloring [17], the problem
is to pack colored items into bins, such that the maximum
number of different colors per bin is minimized. The bin
coloring games were considered in [15], where players control
colored items and each player aims at packing its item into a
bin with as few different colors as possible.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper dealing
with Nash equilibria in colorful bin packing games.
II. MODEL AND PRELIMINARIES
In a colorful bin packing game G =
(N,C,B, (si)i∈N , (ci)i∈N ) we have a set of n players
N = {1, . . . , n}, a set of m ≥ 2 colors C = {1, . . . ,m} and
a set of n unit capacity bins B = {B1 . . . , Bn}. Each player
i ∈ N controls an indivisible item, denoted for convenience
as xi (i.e., we denote by X = {x1, . . . , xn} the set of items),
having size si ∈ [0, 1] and color ci ∈ C which needs to be
packed into one bin in B without exceeding its capacity. Game
G has uniform sizes if si = sj for every i, j ∈ N . The special
case in which G has m = 2 colors is called the black and
white bin packing game; we shall define color 1 as black,
color 2 as white and denote by #B and #W the number of
black and white items in G, respectively.
A strategy profile is modeled by an n-tuple σ = (σ1, . . . , σn)
such that, for each i ∈ N , σi ∈ B is the bin chosen by player
i. We denote by Bj(σ) = {xi ∈ X : σi = Bj} the set
of items packed into Bj according to the strategy profile σ.
Similarly, we also write σi(σ) = {xl ∈ X : σl = σi} to
indicate the set of items packed in the same bin as xi (i.e., the
bin chosen by player i), according to σ. Given any bin Bj , we
assume to pack the items in a fixed internal order, going from
bottom to top, that is the sequential order in which players
have chosen the bin Bj as strategy. Namely, for any pair of
items xi and xl in Bj(σ), we say that xi precedes xl inside
the bin Bj , and we write xi ≺σ xl, if player i chose bin Bj
before l. Formally, given any strategy profile σ, each item
xi occupies a precise position pi(σ) in the sequential order
of items in bin σi, counting from bottom to top, computed
as pi(σ) = 1 + |{xl ∈ σi(σ) : xl ≺σ xi}|. For convenience,
if the strategy profile is clear from the context we may omit
the symbol σ and simply write pi. We notice that, with such
packing, the last player, say i, choosing the bin σi, occupies
the top position in σi.
Denoted by `Bj (σ) =
∑
xi∈Bj(σ) si the total size of items
packed into Bj(σ), we always assume that `Bj (σ) ≤ 1, so
that every strategy profile induces a packing of items in B and
vice versa.
We say that an item xi is misplaced if there exists an item
xl with ci = cl such that σi = σl and |pi− pl| = 1, that is, xi
is packed next to an item of the same color. A bin is feasible
if it stores no misplaced items. In particular, an empty bin is
feasible. A strategy profile is feasible if so are all of its bins.
For games with uniform sizes si = s for every i ∈ N , we
denote by κ =
⌊
1
s
⌋
the maximum number of items that can
be packed into any (even non-feasible) bin. We only consider
the cases in which κ > 1 as, otherwise, the game is trivial.
We shall denote by costi(σ) the cost that player i ∈ N pays
in the strategy profile σ and each player aims at minimizing
it. We consider two different cost functions: the egalitarian
cost function and the proportional cost function. We have
costi(σ) = ∞ under both cost functions when xi is a
misplaced item, while, for non-misplaced ones, we have
costi(σ) =
1
|σi(σ)| under the egalitarian cost function and
costi(σ) =
si
`σi (σ)
under the proportional one. Note that, for
games with uniform sizes, the two cost functions coincide. For
a fixed strategy profile σ, we say that a bin is a singleton
bin if it stores only one item. Moreover, when considering
the egalitarian (resp. proportional) cost function, we denote by
Bσ the bin storing the maximum number of items (resp. the
fullest bin) in the packing corresponding to σ, breaking ties
arbitrarily.
A deviation for a player i in a strategy profile σ is the action
of changing the selected bin σi in favor of another bin, say
Bj , such that `Bj (σ) + si ≤ 1. We shall denote as (σ−i, Bj)
the strategy profile realized after the deviation. Formally, σ′ =
(σ−i, Bj) = (σ′1, , . . . , σ
′
n) is defined as follows: σ
′
i = Bj and
σ′l = σl for each player l 6= i.
In this paper, we consider deviations of the following form:
xi is removed from σi and packed on top of Bj , consistently
with the sequential order of items in a bin.
An improving deviation for a player i in a strategy profile
σ is a deviation towards a bin Bj such that costi(σ−i, Bj) <
costi(σ). Fix a feasible strategy profile σ. Under the egalitarian
cost function, player i admits an improving deviation in σ if
there exists a bin Bj ∈ B \ {σi} such that (i) the item on
top of Bj has a color different than ci and (ii) |σi(σ)| ≤
|Bj(σ)|. Under the proportional cost function, player i admits
an improving deviation in σ if there exists a bin Bj ∈ B\{σi}
such that (i) the item on top of Bj has a color different than
ci and (ii) `σi(σ) < `Bj (σ) + si. Conversely, when a strategy
profile σ is unfeasible, under both cost functions, a player
controlling a misplaced item x always possesses an improving
deviation, for instance, by moving x to an empty bin which is
always guaranteed to exist as there are n items, n bins and the
bin storing x is non-singleton. We note that, as a side-effect
of an improving deviation, (σ−i, Bj) may be unfeasible even
if σ is feasible: this happens when xi separates two items of
the same color. We say that an improving deviation is valid
whenever the destination bin is feasible before the deviation.
A strategy profile σ is a (pure) Nash equilibrium if
costi(σ) ≤ costi(σ−i, Bj) for each i ∈ N and Bj ∈ B,
that is, no player has an improving deviation in σ. Let NE(G)
denote the set of Nash equilibria of game G. It is easy to see
that any Nash equilibrium is a feasible strategy profile. This
implies that m = 1 would force each item to be packed into
a different bin: this justifies our choice of m ≥ 2. A game G
has the finite improvement path property if it does not admit
an infinite sequence of improving deviations. Clearly, if G
enjoys the finite improvement path property, it follows that
NE(G) 6= ∅.
Given a strategy profile σ, let O(σ) ⊆ B be the set of open
bins in σ, where a bin is open if it stores at least one item. Let
F(σ) be the number of open bins in σ, i.e., F(σ) = |O(σ)|.
We shall denote with σ∗(G) the social optimum, that is, any
strategy profile minimizing function F. It is easy to see that
any social optimum is a feasible strategy profile.
The price of anarchy of G is defined as PoA(G) =
maxσ∈NE(G)
F(σ)
F(σ∗(G)) , while the price of stability of G is
defined as PoS(G) = minσ∈NE(G)
F(σ)
F(σ∗(G)) . Given a class
of colorful bin packing games C, the prices of anarchy and
stability of C are defined as PoA(C) = supG∈C PoA(G) and
PoS(C) = supG∈C PoS(G). Let Gm denote the set of all
colorful bin packing games with m colors and Uoddm (resp.
Uevenm ) denote the set of all colorful bin packing games with
m colors and uniform sizes for which κ is odd (resp. even).
Finally, denote Um = Uevenm ∪ Uoddm .
III. EXISTENCE AND EFFICIENCY OF NASH EQUILIBRIA IN
GENERAL GAMES
In this section, we first show that, without any particular
restriction on the type of improving deviations performed by
the players, even games with uniform sizes and only two
colors may not admit the finite improvement path property
(Proposition 3.1). However, if one allows the players to perform
only valid improving deviations, then any game possesses
the finite improving path property under both cost functions
(Theorems 3.2 and 3.3). These two theorems, together with the
fact that in any strategy profile which is not a Nash equilibrium
there always exists a valid improving deviation, imply the
existence of Nash equilibria for colorful bin packing games
under both cost functions.
Proposition 3.1: There exists a black and white bin packing
game with uniform sizes not possessing the finite improvement
path property.
Proof: Let G be a black and white bin packing game with
uniform sizes defined by three black items, denoted as b1, b2
and b3, and three white items, denoted as w1, w2 and w3. All
items have size 1/4, so that κ = 4. Figure 1 depicts a cyclic
sequence of (non-valid) improving deviations which shows the
claim.
Fig. 1. A cyclic sequence of (non-valid) improving deviations.
Theorem 3.2: If players are restricted to perform only
valid improving deviations, then each colorful bin packing
game under the egalitarian cost function admits the finite
improvement path property.
Proof: To prove the claim, we define a suitable potential
function which strictly increases each time a player performs a
valid improving deviation. Given a strategy profile σ, consider
the potential function
Φ(σ) =
∑
Bj∈O(σ):Bj is feasible
|Bj(σ)||Bj(σ)|
and assume that a player i performs a valid improving deviation
by moving xi onto bin Bj 6= σi. We distinguish between two
cases.
If bin σi is not feasible since both Bj(σ) and Bj(σ−i, Bj)
are feasible, we obtain Φ(σ−i, Bj) − Φ(σ) ≥ (|Bj(σ)| +
1)|Bj(σ)|+1 − |Bj(σ)||Bj(σ)| > 0 when Bj(σ) is open and
Φ(σ−i, Bj)− Φ(σ) ≥ 11 − 0 > 0 otherwise.
If σi is feasible, under the egalitarian cost function, this
implies that |Bj(σ)| ≥ |σi(σ)|. Observe that, since σi
is feasible, costi(σ) ≤ 1, which implies that it must be
|Bj(σ)| ≥ 1. For the ease of notation, set |σi(σ)| = α and
|Bj(σ)| = β, so that β ≥ α and β ≥ 1; we get
Φ(σ−i, Bj)− Φ(σ) ≥ (β + 1)β+1 − αα − ββ
= (β + 1)(β + 1)β − αα − ββ
≥ 2(β + 1)β − αα − ββ
≥ 2(β + 1)β − 2ββ
> 0,
where the second inequality comes from β ≥ 1 and the third
one comes from β ≥ α. Thus, in any case, Φ(σ−i, Bj) > Φ(σ)
which, since the number of possible strategy profiles is finite,
implies the claim.
The next proof uses a different function than the one used
above.
Theorem 3.3: If players are restricted to perform only
valid improving deviations, then each colorful bin packing
game under the proportional cost function admits the finite
improvement path property.
Proof: To prove the claim, we define a suitable potential
function which strictly increases each time a player performs
a valid improving deviation. Denote P(N) as the power set
of N and, given a set X ∈ P(N), denote S(X) = ∑i∈X si.
Define
δ = min
X,Y ∈P(N):S(X)6=S(Y )
|S(X)− S(Y )| > 0
and let ρ >> 1 be a number such that ρδ > 2. Given a strategy
profile σ, consider the potential function
Φ(σ) =
∑
Bj∈O(σ):Bj is feasible
ρ`Bj(σ)
and assume that a player i performs a valid improving deviation
by moving xi onto bin Bj 6= σi, which implies si > 0. We
distinguish between two cases.
If bin σi is not feasible, since both Bj(σ) and Bj(σ−i, Bj)
are feasible, we obtain Φ(σ−i, Bj) − Φ(σ) ≥ ρ`Bj(σ)+si −
ρ`Bj(σ) > 0.
If σi is feasible, under the proportional cost function, this
implies that `Bj (σ) + si > `σi(σ). For the ease of notation,
set `σi(σ) = α and `Bj (σ) = β, so that β + si > α, which,
by the definition of δ, implies that β + si ≥ max{α, β}+ δ;
we get
Φ(σ−i, Bj)− Φ(σ) ≥ ρβ+si − ρα − ρβ
≥ ρmax{α,β}+δ − 2ρmax{α,β}
= ρmax{α,β}
(
ρδ − 2)
> 0,
where the last inequality comes from the definition of ρ. Thus,
in any case, Φ(σ−i, Bj) > Φ(σ) which, since the number of
possible strategy profiles is finite, implies the claim.
In the following we give a tight characterization of the
efficiency of Nash equilibria in colorful bin packing games
under both cost functions. This is achieved by giving upper
bounds on the PoA and matching or asymptotically matching
lower bounds on the PoS. For games with at least three colors,
Theorems 3.4 and 3.5 show that, under both cost functions, the
PoS can be unbounded, thus, in the worst-case, no efficient
Nash equilibria are guaranteed to exist.
Theorem 3.4: Under the egalitarian cost function, PoS(Gm)
is unbounded for each m ≥ 3.
Proof: Fix a value m ≥ 3. We show the theorem by
proving that there exists a game Gm ∈ Gm with n players
such that
PoS(Gm) ≥

n
32 if m = 3,
n(2m−5)
18(m−1) if m ∈ {4, 5, 6},
n(m−3)
8(m−1) if m ≥ 7.
By taking the limit for n going to ∞, the theorem will follow.
We construct game Gm as follows. There are:
• hk white items of size 1/k − hδ,
• for every color other than white, h(k−1)m−1 items of size δ,
where h and k are arbitrary integers such that h ≥ 2 and k is
a multiple of m, while δ > 0 is an arbitrarily small real value
such that δ < (hk(k + 1))−1.
Observe that, since a combination of k white items and k−1
non-white items can be feasibly packed into the same bin, and
there are exactly hk white items and h(k−1) non-white items,
there exists a feasible strategy profile using exactly h bins.
Moreover, note that k + 1 white items do not fit into a bin,
as their total size is equal to 1 + 1/k − h(k + 1)δ > 1 by the
definition of δ.
We proceed by showing that any Nash equilibrium for Gm
needs to use at least k
(
h− 1− hm−1
)
bins. To this aim, fix
a Nash equilibrium σ for Gm and consider bin Bσ .
If the item on top of Bσ is white, then all non-white items
have to be stored in Bσ . In fact, since Bσ can contain at most
k white items, for an overall occupation of 1− hkδ, it follows
that Bσ has enough space to accommodate all the h(k−1) non-
white items. Thus, since Bσ stores all the non-white items and
can store at most k white items, it follows that σ needs to use at
least k(h−1) singleton bins to feasibly store all white items not
stored in Bσ , so that F(σ) ≥ 1+k(h−1) ≥ k
(
h− 1− hm−1
)
.
Hence, assume that the item of top of Bσ has a color c
which is not white. By the same arguments exploited above,
it follows that Bσ have to contain all non-white items having
color different than c. Again, since Bσ can contain at most
k white items, σ needs to pack at least k(h− 1) white items
outside bin Bσ. To do this, at most
h(k−1)
m−1 − 1 non-white
items (the ones having color c) can be used. The only way to
pack these items so that σ results in a Nash equilibrium is
to use a first-fit-like algorithm. Note that, in order to pack k
white items in the same bin, at least k − 1 item of color c are
needed. Hence, by using h(k−1)m−1 − 1 items of color c, at most
hk
m−1 white items can be packed in a non-singleton bin, so that
at least k
(
h− 1− hm−1
)
white items need to be stored in a
singleton bin.
Thus, we can conclude that PoS(Gm) ≥ kh
(
h− 1− hm−1
)
.
Set h = 4 for m = 3, h = 3 for m ∈ {4, 5, 6}, and h = 2 for
m ≥ 7. For sufficiently high values of k, by using k > n2h ,
the claim follows.
Theorem 3.5: Under the proportional cost function, PoS(Gm)
is unbounded for each m ≥ 3.
Proof: We prove the claim under the hypothesis of m = 3.
It is easy to adapt the proof so as to deal with any number of
colors m ≥ 3.
Consider the following instance with n players, where n
is a multiple of 4. There are n2 items of color c1,
n
4 of color
c2, and n4 of color c3. The sizes are such that, one item of
color c1 has size a, while all the others n2 − 1 ones have size
b. Finally, each item of color c2 or c3 has size c. The values
of the sizes a, b, c are as follows:
• a = 1− 2n + , for any 0 <  < 2n (i.e., a < 1).
• b = 1− a
• 0 < c ≤ 2n ( 2n − )
Notice that
∑n
i=1 si > 1, therefore any solution cannot use
less than two bins. An optimal solution can be achieved by
assigning the item of size a to one bin, and all the other items
to a second bin, as depicted in Figure 2. Notice that, (i) the total
size of items packed in the second bin is at most a. Moreover,
(ii) a + cn2 ≤ 1, i.e., the item of size a and all the items of
size c can be packed together in a bin.
We further notice that, the item of size a cannot be packed
with any other item of the same color c1, because at least
one element of different color is needed between them, and
a+ b+ c > 1.
Consider any Nash equilibrium where the item of size a is
packed in a bin B. We now show that at most two items of
size c, are not packed in B. Let us suppose, by contradiction,
that there exist at least three items of size c that are not packed
in the bin B. If among such three items, there exist one of
color c2 and another one of color c3, then, by properties (i)
and (ii), we get a contradiction with the fact that it is a Nash
Equilibrium. Thus, the three items must have the same color,
and without loss of generality, suppose that it is c2. In this
case we also get a contradiction. Indeed, it is easy to see that,
it is not possible to pack n2 items of color c3 in the bin B,
by using at most n2 − 3 items of color c2. We conclude by
noticing that, at least n2 − 5 items of sizes b must be packed
into singleton bins, and this concludes the proof.
Fig. 2. An optimal configuration for the instance considered in Theorem 3.5.
We conclude the section by presenting a simple algorithm,
namely Algorithm 1, for computing a Nash equilibrium in
colorful bin packing games under both cost functions. In
particular, we shall prove that its running time is polynomial
for the egalitarian cost function and pseudo-polynomial for the
proportional one for the special case of constant number of
colors. Algorithm 1 is based on the computation of a solution
for the following two optimization problems.
Max Cardinality Colorful Packing: Given a set of items X =
{x1, . . . , xn}, where, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, xi has size si ∈ [0, 1]
and color ci, compute a set of items, of maximum cardinality,
which can be packed into a feasible bin without exceeding its
capacity.
Colorful Subset Sum: Given a set of items X = {x1, . . . , xn},
where, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, xi has size si ∈ [0, 1] and color
ci, compute a set of items, of maximum total size, which can
be packed into a feasible bin without exceeding its capacity.
Next lemma shows the correctness of the algorithm.
Lemma 3.6: Algorithm 1 computes a Nash equilibrium for
any colorful bin packing game G.
Proof: Consider the strategy profile σ returned by Algo-
rithm 1 and assume, for the sake of contradiction, that it is not
a Nash equilibrium. Then, there exist an item xi packed into a
bin Bj and a bin Bk 6= Bj such that xi can be feasibly packed
into Bk and |Bj(σ)| ≤ |Bk(σ)| under the egalitarian cost
function, while `Bj (σ) < `Bk(σ) + si under the proportional
one. Now, if Bj is opened before Bk by Algorithm 1, we
have that the set of items packed into Bk together with xi
is a better packing than Bj , thus contradicting its optimality.
Conversely, if Bk is opened before Bj by Algorithm 1, we
have that the set of items packed into Bk together with xi
is a better packing than Bk, thus contradicting its optimality.
Hence, in both cases, we get a contradiction.
We are also able to show that Max Cardinality Colorful
Packing can be efficiently solved.
Lemma 3.7: Max Cardinality Colorful Packing can be
solved in polynomial time.
Proof: Our proof is based on the following two fun-
damental observations: (i) a set B of colored items can be
feasibly packed into a bin without exceeding its capacity if and
only if the frequency of the dominant color in B is at most
d|B|/2e, (ii) if there exists a set B of colored items that can
be feasibly packed into a bin without exceeding its capacity
whose dominant color c∗ has frequency k∗, then the set of
items computed as follows:
• choose the k∗ items of color c∗ having minimum size;
• let Y be the set of items obtained by choosing from X ,
for each color other than c∗, the k∗ items of minimum
size (or all items if there are less than k∗ items of that
color);
• number all items in Y in non-decreasing order of sizes;
• choose the first |B| − k∗ items in Y ;
can also be feasibly packed into a bin without exceeding its
capacity.
Let B∗ be an optimal solution to the problem, c∗ be the
dominant color in B∗ and k∗ be the frequency of the items
of color c∗ in B∗. If we knew both c∗ and k∗, because of
observation (ii), a solution B′ such that |B′| = |B∗| can
be constructed in time O(n log n). Thus, the claim follows
by guessing all possible n3 pairs (c∗, k∗, |B∗|), with k∗ ≤
d|B∗|/2e, and then returning the best feasible solution.1
For what concerns Colorful Subset Sum, the problem can
be solved in pseudo-polynomial time as long as the number
of colors is constant.
1Indeed, it is possible to lower the computational complexity of the algorithm
by considering only the n2 pairs (c∗, k∗) by noting that the algorithm used
within observation (ii) can be easily adapted to deal with the case in which
|B| is not known.
Lemma 3.8: Colorful Subset Sum can be solved in pseudo-
polynomial time as long as the number of colors is constant.
Proof: Assume to know the exact number of items of
each color c∗1, . . . , c
∗
m that belong to an optimal solution. Note
that Colorful Subset Sum becomes a variant of a Knapsack
problem in which item are partitioned into m sets according
to their colors and one wants to maximize the sum of the
volumes of the items packed in the knapsack without exceeding
its capacity by choosing exactly c∗i items from each set. By
suitably extending the dynamic programming algorithm for the
knapsack problem and guessing the O(nm) possible tuples
c∗1, . . . , c
∗
m such that c
∗ = max{c∗1, . . . , c∗m} ≤
⌈∑
i c
∗
i−c∗
2
⌉
,
the claim follows.
As a consequence of Lemmas 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8, we obtain
the following result.
Theorem 3.9: A Nash equilibrium for colorful bin packing
games can be computed in polynomial time under the egalitar-
ian cost function and in pseudo-polynomial time for a constant
number of colors under the proportional one.
IV. EFFICIENCY OF NASH EQUILIBRIA IN BLACK AND
WHITE GAMES
For black and white bin packing games, things get much
more interesting, as we show an upper bound of 3 on the PoA
and a corresponding lower bound on the PoS. To address this
particular case, given a black and white bin packing game
G, we make use of the following additional notation. Given a
strategy profile σ, we denote by Sb(σ) the set of singleton bins
storing a black item, by Sw(σ) the set of singleton bins storing
a white item, by Mb(σ) the set of non-singleton bins having
a black item on top, and by Mw(σ) the set of non-singleton
bins having a white item on top.
The following lemma relates the set of open bins of a feasible
strategy profile with that of a social optimum.
Lemma 4.1: Fix a feasible strategy profile σ and a social
optimum σ∗ for a black and white bin packing game G. Then,
|Sb(σ)| − |Sw(σ)| − |Mw(σ)| ≤ F(σ∗).
Proof: First, we observe that, since in any open bin of
σ∗ the absolute value of the difference between the number
of black and white items is at most 1, we have
#B ≤ #W + F(σ∗). (1)
Now, let us denote with zb the number of black items
packed into bins belonging to Mb(σ) ∪ Mw(σ) and with
zw the number of white items packed into bins belonging
to Mb(σ) ∪ Mw(σ). We have zb = #B − |Sb(σ)| and
zw = #W − |Sw(σ)|. Moreover, the number of black items
packed into bins belonging to Mb(σ) ∪ Mw(σ) is at least
the number of white items packed into bins belonging to
Mb(σ) ∪ Mw(σ) minus |Mw(σ)|, so that, by putting all
together, we obtain
#B ≥ #W + |Sb(σ)| − |Sw(σ)| − |Mw(σ)|. (2)
By combining inequalities (1) and (2), the claim follows.
The following theorem gives an upper bound on the PoA of
black and white bin packing games under both cost functions.
Algorithm 1 It takes as input a colorful bin packing game G
1: X ← {x1, . . . , xn}
2: while (X 6= ∅) do
3: if (G is defined under the egalitarian cost function) then
4: Let B be a solution to Max Cardinality Colorful Packing(X)
5: else
6: Let B be a solution to Colorful Subset Sum(X)
7: end if
8: Open a new bin and assign it the set of items B
9: X ← X \B
10: end while
11: return the strategy profile induced by the set of open bins
Theorem 4.2: Under both cost functions, PoA(G2) ≤ 3.
Proof: Given a black and white bin packing game G under
a certain cost function, fix a Nash equilibrium σ and a social
optimum σ∗. Let S =
∑
i∈N si be the sum of the sizes of all
the items. Notice that F(σ∗) ≥ dSe. Assume without loss of
generality that |Sb(σ)| ≥ |Sw(σ)| (if this is not the case, we
simply swap the two colors).
Let P be the set of pairs of bins constructed as follows: each
bin in Sw(σ) is paired with a bin in Sb(σ), each remaining
bin in Sb(σ) is paired with a bin in Mw(σ), finally, all the
remaining bins in Mw(σ) and all the bins in Mb(σ) are joined
into pairs until possible. It is easy to check that, for each
created pair of bins (Bj , Bk), it must be
`Bj (σ) + `Bk(σ) > 1 (3)
under both cost functions, otherwise the hypothesis that σ is
a Nash equilibrium would be contradicted. Moreover, by (3),
it follows that S > |P | which implies that F(σ∗) ≥ dSe ≥
|P |+ 1.
Now two cases may occur:
• no bin in Sb(σ) is left unmatched by P , which implies
that |Sb(σ)|+ |Sw(σ)|+ |Mb(σ)|+ |Mw(σ)| ≤ 2|P |+1,
as at most one bin from the set Mw(σ) ∪Mb(σ) may
remain unmatched. Thus, we obtain
F(σ) = |Sb(σ)|+ |Sw(σ)|+ |Mb(σ)|+ |Mw(σ)|
≤ 2|P |+ 1
< 2F(σ∗);
• at least one bin in Sb(σ) is unmatched by P , which
implies that |Sb(σ)|+ |Sw(σ)|+ |Mb(σ)|+ |Mw(σ)| ≤
2|P |+1+ |Sb(σ)|−|Sw(σ)|−|Mw(σ)|. Thus, we obtain
F(σ) = |Sb(σ)|+ |Sw(σ)|+ |Mb(σ)|+ |Mw(σ)|
≤ 2|P |+ 1 + |Sb(σ)| − |Sw(σ)| − |Mw(σ)|
≤ 2|P |+ 1 + F(σ∗)
< 2F(σ∗) + F(σ∗)
= 3F(σ∗),
where the second inequality comes from Lemma 4.1.
In the next two theorems, we show a matching lower bound
on the PoS of black and white bin packing games under both
cost functions.
Theorem 4.3: Under the egalitarian cost function, PoS(G2) ≥
3.
Proof: We prove the theorem by showing that, for any
 > 0, there exists a black and white bin packing game G ∈ G2
such that PoS(G) ≥ 3− . G is defined by the following set
of items:
• 2k white items having size 1k − 2δ, denoted as items of
type (1);
• k/2 black items having size 1, denoted as items of type
(2);
• 2k black items having size δ, denoted as items of type
(3);
• k white items having size 0, denoted as items of type (4);
where k is an even integer such that k ≥ max{ 10−4 , 19}
and δ > 0 is arbitrarily small.
Denote with σ the strategy profile such that O(σ) =
(B1, . . . , Bh) with h = 3k2 + 1 and such that
• bin B1 contains k items of type (1), k items of type (4)
and 2k items of type (3),
• each bin from B2 to Bk+1, for a total of k bins, contains
one item of type (1),
• each bin from Bk+2 to Bh, for a total of k/2 bins, contains
one item of type (2).
In the definition of σ, we avoid considering the order in which
the items are packed within each bin as it is irrelevant to our
purposes. We only stress the fact that there exists a proper
ordering of the items which makes σ a feasible strategy profile.
Now, denote with σ∗ the strategy profile such that O(σ∗) =
(B∗1 , . . . , B
∗
h∗) with h
∗ = k2 + 2 and such that
• bins B∗1 and B∗2 both contain k items of type (1) and k
items of type (3),
• each bin from B∗3 to B∗h∗ , for a total of k/2 bins, contains
one item of type (2) and 2 items of type (4).
Also in this case, we avoid considering the order in which
the items are packed within each bin and stress the fact that
there exists a proper ordering of the items which makes σ∗ a
feasible strategy profile.
In order to show the claimed lower bound on PoS(G), we
proceed by proving that the packing of items corresponding
to any Nash equilibrium for G coincides with the one
corresponding to O(σ). This is achieved by exploiting a
sequence of results.
First of all, we observe the following basic fact.
Fact 1: In any Nash equilibrium for G, any bin containing
an item of type (2) can store at most 3 items.
We continue by proving some basic properties possessed by
bin Bτ , for any Nash equilibrium τ for G.
Lemma 4.4: Fix a Nash equilibrium τ for G. Then, Bτ
stores at least 4 items.
Proof: Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that Bτ
stores at most 3 items. Since the total number of items is 11k2 ,
it follows that τ is made up of at least
⌈
11k
6
⌉
bins. This implies
that PoA(G) ≥ F(τ )F(σ∗) ≥
d 11k6 e
k
2 +2
≥ 11k6k
2 +2
= 113 − 443(k+4) =
3 + 23 − 443(k+4) > 3.
Since k > 18: a contradiction to Theorem 4.2.
As a consequence of Fact 1 and Lemma 4.4, we get the
following corollary.
Corollary 4.5: Fix a Nash equilibrium τ for G. No item
of type (2) is packed into Bτ .
Lemma 4.6: Fix a Nash equilibrium τ for G. All items of
type (4) are packed into Bτ .
Proof: Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that there
exists an item of type (4), say xi, which is not packed into
Bτ . Since τ is a Nash equilibrium, the item on top of Bτ
must be white, otherwise player i would lower her cost by
migrating to Bτ . By Corollary 4.5, Bτ can only store items of
type (1), (3) and (4). The load coming from items of type (1)
packed into Bτ can be at most 1− 2kδ (since at most k items
of type (1) can be packed into the same bin), so that bin Bτ
can potentially store all items of type (3). This implies that all
of these items must indeed be packed into Bτ , otherwise the
player owning any of the leftover ones would lower her cost by
migrating to Bτ . Hence, we can conclude that Bτ stores 2k
black items and the item on top of Bτ is white. This implies
that Bτ has to store at least 2k white items. Now, since at
most k items of type (1) can be packed into the same bin, Bτ
needs to store all items of type (4).
Lemma 4.7: Fix a Nash equilibrium τ for G. All items of
type (3) are packed into Bτ .
Proof: Assume, for the sake of contradiction, that there
exists an item of type (3), say xi, which is not packed into
Bτ . Again, by Corollary 4.5, Bτ can only store items of type
(1), (3) and (4) and the load coming from items of type (1)
packed into Bτ can be at most 1− 2kδ, so that bin Bτ can
potentially store all items of type (3). Hence, since τ is a Nash
equilibrium, the item on top of Bτ must be black, otherwise
player i would lower her cost by migrating to Bτ . This implies
that the total load of Bτ has to exceed 1−1/k+2δ, otherwise
any player owning an item of type (1) would lower her cost
by migrating to Bτ . Given that no item of type (2) can be
stored in Bτ , we have that, in order to achieve a load of more
than 1− 1/k+ 2δ, Bτ has to store exactly k items of type (1).
Moreover, by Lemma 4.6, all items of type (4) are packed in
Bτ . Hence, we can conclude that Bτ stores exactly 2k white
items and the item on top of Bτ is black. This implies that Bτ
has to store at least 2k black items none of which belonging
to type (2), that is, Bτ has to store all items of type (3).
We can finally prove that all Nash equilibria for G
correspond to the same packing of items.
Lemma 4.8: Fix a Nash equilibrium τ for G. Then, O(τ )
and O(σ) are equal up to a renumbering of the bins.
Proof: Fix a Nash equilibrium τ for G. By Lemmas 4.6
and 4.7, it follows that Bτ stores all items of type (3) and (4),
that is, 2k black items and k white items. Hence, in order to
obtain a feasible strategy profile, Bτ needs to store at least
k− 1 items of type (1). Moreover, Bτ cannot store more than
k items of type (1). If Bτ stores k − 1 items of type (1), the
player owning any of the leftover items of type (1) would lower
her cost by migrating to Bτ . This implies that Bτ needs to
store exactly k items of type (1). Since the remaining k items
of type (1) and all items of type (2) can only be packed into
different bins, it follows that there exists a suitable renumbering
of the bins in τ which gives O(τ ) = O(σ).
We can conclude our proof by lower bounding the price of
stability of G. Because of Lemma 4.8, we get
PoS(G) ≥ F(σ)
F(σ∗)
=
3k
2 + 1
k
2 + 2
= 3− 10
k + 4
≥ 3− ,
since k ≥ 10−4 implies that  ≥ 10k+4 .
Theorem 4.9: Under the proportional cost function,
PoS(G2) ≥ 3.
Proof: We prove the theorem by showing that, for any
 > 0, there exists a black and white bin packing game G ∈ G2
such that PoS(G) ≥ 3− . G is defined by the following set
of items:
• 2k white items having size 1k − 3δ, denoted as items of
type (1);
• k/2 black items having size 1− 5kδ, denoted as items of
type (2);
• 2k black items having size δ, denoted as items of type
(3);
• k white items having size δ, denoted as items of type (4);
where k is an even integer such that k ≥ max{ 10−4 , 2} and
δ > 0 is an arbitrarily small number satisfying δ < (k(5k +
3))−1.
Denote with σ the strategy profile such that O(σ) =
(B1, . . . , Bh) with h = 3k2 + 1 and such that
• bin B1 contains k items of type (1), k items of type (4)
and 2k items of type (3),
• each bin from B2 to Bk+1, for a total of k bins, contains
one item of type (1),
• each bin from Bk+2 to Bh, for a total of k/2 bins, contains
one item of type (2).
In the definition of σ, we avoid considering the order in which
the items are packed within each bin as it is irrelevant to our
purposes. We only stress the fact that there exists a proper
ordering of the items which makes σ a feasible strategy profile.
Now, denote with σ∗ the strategy profile such that O(σ∗) =
(B∗1 , . . . , B
∗
h∗) with h
∗ = k2 + 2 and such that
• bins B∗1 and B∗2 both contain k items of type (1) and k
items of type (3),
• each bin from B∗3 to B∗h∗ , for a total of k/2 bins, contains
one item of type (2) and 2 items of type (4).
Also in this case, we avoid considering the order in which
the items are packed within each bin and stress the fact that
there exists a proper ordering of the items which makes σ∗ a
feasible strategy profile.
In order to show the claimed lower bound on PoS(G), we
proceed by proving that the packing of items corresponding
to any Nash equilibrium for G coincides with the one
corresponding to O(σ). This is achieved by exploiting a
sequence of results.
Fact 2: No bin can store more than k items of type (1).
Proof: k + 1 items of type (1) require a total space of
(k + 1)(1/k − 3δ) = 1 + 1/k − 3(k + 1)δ > 1 since δ <
(k(5k + 3))−1 < (3k(k + 1))−1.
Fact 3: No bin can store more than 1 item of type (2).
Proof: Two items of type (2) require a total space of
2− 10kδ > 1 since δ < (k(5k + 3))−1 < (10k)−1.
Fact 4: No bin can simultaneously store items of types (1)
and (2).
Proof: One item of type (1) and one item of type (2)
require a total space of 1/k− 3δ+ 1− 5kδ = 1 + 1/k− (5k+
3)δ > 1 since δ < (k(5k + 3))−1.
Fact 5: For any strategy profile τ , Bτ either contains exactly
one item of type (2) and no items of type (1) or exactly k
items of type (1) and no items of type (2).
Proof: Clearly, we have
`Bτ (τ ) ≥ 1− 5kδ (4)
(a bin containing an items of type (2) has at least this
occupation) which, given that δ < (k(5k + 3))−1 < (8k)−1,
Bτ cannot contain only items of types (3) and (4). If Bτ
contains items of type (2), then, by Facts 3 and 4, it has to
contain exactly one item of this type. On the contrary, if Bτ
contains items of type (1), then by Facts 2 and 4, it can only
contain k items of this time, but no more than k of them. If
Bτ contains at most k − 1 items of type (1), then, as Bτ can
additionally contain all items of types (3) and (4), we have
`Bτ (τ ) ≤ (k−1)(1/k−3δ) + 3kδ = 1−1/k+ 3δ < 1−5kδ
as δ < (k(5k + 3))−1, thus contradicting inequality (4).
Fact 6: For any strategy profile τ , Bτ has enough unused
space to store all items of types (3) and (4) which are not
packed into Bτ .
Proof: Fix a strategy profile τ . By Fact 5, we need to
distinguish between two cases only. If Bτ contains an item
of type (2) and no items of type (1), since all items of types
(3) and (4) can be packed into the leftover space of 5kδ, the
claim follows. If Bτ contains k item of type (1) and no items
of type (2), since all items of types (3) and (4) can be packed
into the leftover space of 3kδ, the claim follows.
We continue by showing a fundamental structural property.
Lemma 4.10: Fix a Nash equilibrium τ for G. Then, Bτ
stores all items of type (4).
Proof: Fix a Nash equilibrium τ for G and assume, by
way of contradiction, that at least one item xj of type (4) is
not packed into Bτ . By Fact 6, it follows that the item on
top of Bτ is white, otherwise player j would lower her cost
by migrating to Bτ . Again, by Fact 6, this implies that all
items of type (3) are packed into Bτ , otherwise the player
owing a leftover item would lower her cost by migrating to
Bτ . Thus, we have that Bτ stores at least 2k black items. As,
by hypothesis Bτ does not store all items of type (4), by Fact
5, the number of white items packed into Bτ is at most 2k−1.
Thus, we get a contradiction as it is not possible to feasible
pack 2k black items and 2k − 1 white items in such a way
that the item of top of the bin is white.
We can now prove that all Nash equilibria for G correspond
to the same packing of items.
Lemma 4.11: Fix a Nash equilibrium τ for G. Then, O(τ )
and O(σ) are equal up to a renumbering of the bins.
Proof: Fix a Nash equilibrium τ for G. We show the
claim by proving that Bτ contains k items of type (1) and all
items of types (3) and (4). By Fact 5, we have to distinguish
between two cases only.
Assume first that Bτ contains an item of type (2) and no
items of type (1). As Bτ can feasibly store all items of type
(4) and no more than k items of type (3), we get `Bτ (τ ) ≤
1−5kδ+2kδ = 1−3kδ. Now, let B˜τ be the bin containing the
maximum number of items of type (1) in τ . We claim that B˜τ
contains k items of type (1). Assume, by way of contradiction,
that B˜τ contains at most k−1 items of type (1). If the item on
top of B˜τ is black, we get a contradiction as the player owning
an item of type (1) not packed into B˜τ would lower her cost by
migrating to B˜τ . If the item on top of B˜τ is white, it follows
that B˜τ can store at most k − 1 items of type (3). Given that
Bτ contains at most k items of type (3), it follows that there
is an item of this type, say xj which is packed neither into
Bτ nor into B˜τ . Hence, we get a contradiction as player j
would lower her cost by migrating to B˜τ . Thus, B˜τ contains
k items of type (1). By the same argument exploited above, it
also follows that B˜τ also contains k items of type (3). Hence
we get `B˜τ (τ ) = k(1/k − 3δ) + kδ = 1− 2δ > `Bτ (τ ) thus
contradicting the fact that Bτ contains an item of type (2) and
no items of type (1). So, we conclude that this case cannot
occur.
Now assume that Bτ contains k items of type k and no
items of type (2). By Lemma 4.10, Bτ also contains all k
items of type (4), so that it contains 2k white items. Moreover,
if Bτ does not contain all items of type (3), by Fact 6, the item
on top of Bτ must be black, otherwise the player owing any
leftover item would lower her cost my migrating to Bτ . But
this raises a contradiction, since it is not possible to feasible
pack 2k white items and 2k − 1 black one in such a way that
the item on top of the bin is black. Hence, we have that Bτ
contains all items of type (3) which shows the claim.
We can conclude our proof by lower bounding the price of
stability of G. Because of Lemma 4.11, we get
PoS(G) ≥ F(σ)
F(σ∗)
=
3k
2 + 1
k
2 + 2
= 3− 10
k + 4
≥ 3− ,
since k ≥ 10−4 implies that  ≥ 10k+4 .
V. EFFICIENCY OF NASH EQUILIBRIA IN GAMES WITH
UNIFORM SIZES
In this section, we provide a complete picture of the
efficiency of Nash equilibria for games with uniform sizes.
We remind the reader that, in this setting, the egalitarian and
proportional cost functions are equivalent. For the sake of
simplicity, we say that a bin is full if it contains κ items.
First, we give a lower bound of 2 on the PoS for games
with any number of colors under the hypothesis that κ is an
even number.
Theorem 5.1: For each m ≥ 2, PoS(Uevenm ) ≥ 2.
Proof: We prove the claim under the hypothesis of m = 2.
It is easy to adapt the proof so as to deal with any number of
colors m ≥ 2. In particular, we show that, for any fixed  > 0,
there exists a game G ∈ Ueven2 such that PoS(G) ≥ 2− .
Game G is defined as follows: there are n = k(k + 1)/2
items, of which k2/4 + k/2 are white and the remaining k2/4
are black, where k is an even number such that k ≥ 2(2− )/.
The size of each item is set in such a way that κ = k.
Let σ∗ be the strategy profile such that O(σ∗) =
(B1, . . . , Bk/2+1) where
• each of the first k/2 bins contains k/2 white items and
k/2− 1 black items;
• bin Bk/2+1 contains k/2 white items and k/2 black items.
We continue by proving that each Nash equilibrium for
G uses k open bins. Towards this end, assume, by way of
contradiction, that there exists a Nash equilibrium with less
than k/2 full bins. As k is even, each full bin stores exactly
k/2 white items and k/2 black items, so that the set of full bins
can store at most k
2
4 − k2 items of the same color. It follows
that the set of non-full bins have to store at least k white items
and at least k/2 black ones. Call these items leftover items.
Let B˜ be the non-full bin with the highest number of items.
Clearly, it contains at most k − 1 items and we consider two
cases: if B˜ has a black item on top, as k−1 is odd, B˜ contains
at most k2 − 1 white items. A player owning a leftover white
item not packed into B˜ (there are k/2 + 1 such items) has an
improving deviation to B˜ which raises a contradiction. If B˜
has a white item on top, as k − 1 is odd, B˜ contains at most
k
2 − 1 black items. A player owning the only leftover black
item not packed into B˜ has an improving deviation to B˜ which,
again, raises a contradiction. Thus, each Nash equilibrium for
G uses at least k/2 full bins.
Now note that there are not enough black items in G to
create k/2 + 1 feasible full bins. Hence, since every Nash
equilibrium is feasible, it follows that each Nash equilibrium
σ has exactly k/2 full bins, where a total number of k2/4
white items and k2/4 black ones are packed. The remaining
k/2 white items can be feasibly packed only into singleton
bins, thus yielding F(σ) = k. By the definition of k, we get
PoS(G) ≥ kk/2+1 ≥ 2− .
We show that, unlike the case of general games considered
in the previous section, under the hypothesis of uniform sizes,
efficient Nash equilibria are always guaranteed to exist for
any number of colors. In particular, we design an algorithm
which, given a colorful bin packing game G with uniform sizes,
returns a Nash equilibrium σ such that F(σ) ≤ 2F(σ∗(G))
when κ is even and F(σ) = F(σ∗(G)) when κ is odd. Given
the result on the price of stability of Theorem 5.1, these are
the best achievable performance.
Theorem 5.2: For each m ≥ 2, PoS(Uevenm ) ≤ 2 and
PoS(Uoddm ) = 1. Moreover, for any game G ∈ Um, a Nash
equilibrium σ such that F(σ) ≤ 2F(σ∗(G)) if G ∈ Uevenm and
such that F(σ) = F(σ∗(G)) if G ∈ Uoddm can be computed in
pseudo-polynomial time.
Proof: Fix an integer m ≥ 2 and a game G ∈ Um. We
prove the claim by showing that Algorithm 2 computes a
Nash equilibrium σ for G such that F(σ) ≤ 2F(σ∗(G)) if
G ∈ Uevenm and such that F(σ) = F(σ∗(G)) if G ∈ Uoddm .
We start by showing that the strategy profile σ returned by
Algorithm 2 is a Nash equilibrium for G. Let us partition σ
into three sets, namely Γ,∆,Θ, where Γ contains all the full
bins, ∆ contains all the non-full and non-singleton bins and
Θ contains all the singleton bins. It is not difficult to see that,
by the definition of Algorithm 2, ∆ and Θ are such that (i) ∆
is either empty or contains only one bin, (ii) all items stored
into bins belonging to Θ have the same color, denoted as cΘ,
(iii) the item on top of the bin in ∆ (if any) has color cΘ.
Now assume, by way of contradiction, that there exists a
player j possessing an improving deviation in σ towards a
bin Bi. Clearly, this can only be possible if xj is packed into
a singleton bin and Bi ∈ ∆ ∪ Θ, but properties (ii) and (iii)
above imply a contradiction. So, σ is a Nash equilibrium.
Let nz(c) be the number of items of color c belonging to
X at the zth iteration of Algorithm 2.
Lemma 5.3: If either |Θ| ≥ 2 or |∆| = |Θ| = 1, then the
color of each item occupying an odd position in a bin belonging
to Γ ∪∆ is cΘ.
Proof: Consider an iteration z of Algorithm 2 such that
cold 6= cΘ and an item of color c 6= cΘ is selected. As color
cΘ is a candidate color among the ones considered at line 6
of the algorithm, it must be nz(c) ≥ nz(cΘ). For the case
of |Θ| ≥ 2, let z be the first iteration at which the algorithm
starts constructing singleton bins, while, for the case of |∆| =
|Θ| = 1, let z be the iteration at which the algorithm selects
the last item packed into the unique bin in |∆|. In both cases,
it follows that nz(cΘ)− nz(c) ≥ 2.
Let z′ be the first iteration, among the ones realized after
iteration z, in which an item of color cΘ is selected and such
that nz′(cΘ)− nz′(c) ≥ 2. Clearly, z′ is well-defined because
iteration z meets the required conditions. This implies that
the difference between the number of items of color c and
the number of items of color cΘ selected by Algorithm 2
during all iterations going from z to z′−1 is at least 2. Hence,
there is an iteration z′′ at which an item of color c is selected
Algorithm 2 It takes as input a colorful bin packing game with uniform sizes G
1: X ← {x1, . . . , xn}
2: i← 1
3: cold ← 0
4: while (X 6= ∅) do
5: if (|Bi| < κ) && (∃xj ∈ X s.t. cj 6= cold)) then
6: c← most frequent color among the items in X having color other than cold
7: Select an item xj of color c
8: X ← X \ {xj}
9: cold ← c
10: σj ← Bi
11: else
12: i← i+ 1
13: cold ← 0
14: end if
15: end while
16: return σ
despite the fact that nz′′(cΘ) = nz′′(c) + 1. By line 5 of the
algorithm, this can happen only if cold = cΘ which implies that,
at iteration z′′− 1, an item of color cΘ is selected which gives
nz′′−1(cΘ) = nz′′(cΘ)+1 = nz′′(c)+2 which contradicts the
minimality of z′.
Hence, we have proved that, at each iteration such that
cold 6= cΘ, Algorithm 2 selects an item of color cΘ which
implies the claim.
By the previous lemma, we get the following corollary which
gives us the number of items of color cΘ and the number of
items of color different that cΘ.
Corollary 5.4: If either |Θ| ≥ 2 or |∆| = |Θ| = 1, then each
bin in Bj ∈ O(σ) contains d|Bj(σ)|/2e items of color cΘ.
Let #cΘ be the number of items having color cΘ. We
conclude by showing that F(σ) ≤ 2F(σ∗(G)) when κ is even
and that F(σ) = F(σ∗(G)) when κ is odd. Towards this end,
we use Corollary 5.4 together with the simple basic fact.
Fact 7: 2#cΘ ≤ n+ F(σ∗(G)).
Let us start with the cases not covered by Corollary 5.4, that
is, |Θ| = 0 and |Θ| = 1 ∧ |∆| = 0. In both cases, we have
F(σ) = F(σ∗(G)) independently of the parity of κ, as O(σ)
contains at most one non-full bin. Thus, in the remaining
of the proof, we can assume that Corollary 5.4 holds. Let
δ ∈ {0, . . . , κ− 1} be the number of items stored into the bin
belonging to ∆ (δ = 0 models the case in which this bin does
not exist).
For the case in which κ is odd, by Corollary 5.4, we
have #cΘ = |Γ|κ+12 +
⌈
δ
2
⌉
+ |Θ| and n = |Γ|κ + δ + |Θ|.
Assume, by way of contradiction, that F(σ∗(G)) < F(σ), that
is, F(σ∗(G)) ≤ |Γ|+ |∆|+ |Θ| − 1. By Fact 7, we obtain
2
⌈
δ
2
⌉
≤ δ + |∆| − 1. (5)
Now observe that, for |∆| = 0, which implies δ = 0, (5) is
not satisfied. Hence, it must be |∆| = 1 which, as |Θ| ≥ 1
(recall that we are under the hypothesis in which Corollary 5.4
holds), implies that δ > 1. Now, if δ is even, by Corollary 5.4,
the item on top of the unique bin in ∆ has color different than
cΘ. This means that a player controlling an item packed into
any bin in Θ has an improving deviation by migrating to the
unique bin in ∆, thus contradicting the fact that σ is a Nash
equilibrium. Thus, under the hypothesis of |∆| = 1 and δ odd,
(5) is again not satisfied, thus rising a contradiction. Hence, it
follows that F(σ∗(G)) = F(σ).
For the case in which κ is even, by Corollary 5.4, we
have #cΘ = |Γ|κ2 +
⌈
δ
2
⌉
+ |Θ| and n = |Γ|κ + δ + |Θ|.
As F(σ∗(G)) ≥ |Γ| + |∆|, if |Γ| ≥ |Θ|, it follows F(σ) =
|Γ| + |∆| + |Θ| ≤ 2|Γ| + |∆| ≤ 2F(σ∗(G)). Thus, in the
remaining of the proof, we assume that |Θ| > |Γ|. Assume
now, by way of contradiction, that F(σ∗(G)) < F(σ)/2, which
implies F(σ∗(G)) ≤ |Γ|+|∆|+|Θ|2 − 12 . By Fact 7, we obtain
2
⌈
δ
2
⌉
+
|Θ|
2
≤ δ + |Γ|+ |∆| − 1
2
. (6)
Using the hypothesis that |Θ| > |Γ| within (6), we obtain
2
⌈
δ
2
⌉
≤ δ + |∆|
2
− 1 (7)
which is never satisfied, thus rising a contradiction. Hence, it
follows that F(σ) ≤ 2F(σ∗(G)).
We now argue the complexity of Algorithm 2. We first
notice that, for uniform sizes, the compact representation of
the input has size Ω(m+log n). Moreover, it is easy to see that
Algorithm 2 has complexity O(n). It turns out that when, for
instance, m = Ω(n
1
h ), for some constant h, the algorithm has
polynomial time complexity. However, when m = O(log n),
the complexity is pseudo-polynomial.
Theorems 5.1 and 5.2 completely characterize the PoS of
colorful bin packing games with uniform sizes. For what
concerns the PoA, we also obtain a complete picture by means
of the following results.
For the case of at least three colors, the PoA can be arbitrarily
high.
Theorem 5.5: For each m ≥ 3, both PoA(Uoddm ) and
PoA(Uevenm ) are unbounded.
Proof: We show that there exist two colorful bin packing
games G ∈ Ueven3 and G′ ∈ Uodd3 whose PoA grows
asymptotically with the number of their players. It is easy
to adapt the proof so as to deal with any number of colors
m ≥ 3. Game G is as follows: there are n = 4k players, all of
them of size , where k ≥ 1 is an arbitrary integer, and  > 0
is an arbitrary small real value such that
∑n
i=1 si ≤ 1, so that
κ = 4k is even. There are 2k items of color c1 denoted as
b1, . . . , b2k, k items of color c2 denoted as w1, . . . , wk, and k
items of color c3 denoted as r1, . . . , rk. Notice that F(σ∗) = 1,
since all items can be feasibly packed into the same bin, as
depicted in Figure 3 on the left side. In the same figure, on the
right side, is also depicted a packing corresponding to a Nash
equilibrium σ ∈ NE(G) with social cost F(σ) = 2k = n2 ,
which yields PoA(G) = Ω(n).
Game G′ can be obtained by adding item b0 of color c1 to
game G. This item can be feasibly packed at the bottom of
both bins B1 depicted in Figure 3, so that we get κ = 4k + 1,
which is odd, and PoA(G′) = Ω(n).
Fig. 3. A colorful bin packing game G ∈ U3 with PoA(G) ≥ n2 : on the left
side the packing corresponding to a social optimum and on the right side the
packing corresponding to a Nash equilibrium with social cost 2k.
For the case of black and white bin packing games, we show
a lower bound of 3 on the PoA of games for which κ is an odd
number, thus matching the upper bound showed in Theorem
4.2 which holds for general sizes.
Theorem 5.6: PoA(Uodd2 ) ≥ 3.
Proof: We prove the claim by showing that, for any fixed
 > 0, there exists a game G ∈ Uodd2 such that PoA(G) ≥
3− .
Game G is defined as follows: there are n = k(k + 3)/2
items, of which (k2 + 4k − 1)/4 are white and the remaining
(k + 1)2/4 are black, where k is an odd number such that
k ≥ (8 − 3)/. The size of each item is set in such a way
that κ = k.
Let σ∗ be the strategy profile such that O(σ∗) =
(B1, . . . , B(k+1)/2+1) where
• each of the first (k + 1)/2 bins contains (k + 1)/2 white
items and (k − 1)/2 black items;
• bin B(k+1)/2+1 contains (k − 1)/2 white items and (k +
1)/2 black items.
Since, by definition, at most k items can be packed into a
bin and k is odd, we have F(σ∗(G)) ≥
⌈
n
k
⌉
=
⌈
k+3
2
⌉
=
(k + 1)/2 + 1, so that σ∗ is a social optimum.
Let σ be the strategy profile such that O(σ∗) =
(B1, . . . , B(3k+1)/2) where
• each of the first (k + 1)/2 bins contains (k − 1)/2 white
items and (k + 1)/2 black items;
• each of the remaining k bins contains a single white item.
Since all of the first (k+ 1)/2 bins are full and the remaining
k bins are singletons and contain only white items, it follows
that σ is a Nash equilibrium. By the definition of k, we get
PoA(G) ≥ 3k+1k+3 ≥ 3− .
For the leftover case of black and white bin packing games
for which κ is even, we show that the upper bound on the PoA
drops to 2 which matches the lower bound given in Theorem
5.1 for the PoS.
Theorem 5.7: PoA(Ueven2 ) ≤ 2.
Proof: Fix a game G ∈ Ueven2 and a Nash equilibrium
σ for G. Let us partition σ into three sets, namely Γ,∆,Θ,
where Γ contains all the full bins, ∆ contains all the non-full
and non-singleton bins and Θ contains all the singleton bins.
It is not difficult to see that, by the fact that σ is a Nash
equilibrium, ∆ and Θ are such that (i) ∆ is either empty or
contains only one bin, (ii) all items stored into bins belonging
to Θ have the same color, which we assume without loss of
generality to be black, (iii) the item on top of the bin in ∆
(if any) is black. Let δ ∈ {0, . . . , κ − 1} be the number of
items packed into the unique bin in ∆ (δ = 0 model the case
in which ∆ = ∅). Since κ is even and the item on top of the
bin in ∆ (if any) is black, we have #B = |Γ|κ2 +
⌈
δ
2
⌉
+ |Θ|
and #W = |Γ|κ2 +
⌊
δ
2
⌋
. By substituting the values within
inequality (1), we obtain
|Γ|κ
2
+
⌈
δ
2
⌉
+ |Θ| ≤ |Γ|κ
2
+
⌊
δ
2
⌋
+ F(σ∗(G))
which implies F(σ∗(G)) ≥ |Θ|. Moreover, as all bins in Γ
is full, we have F(σ∗(G)) ≥ |Γ| + |∆|, so that F(σ∗(G)) ≥
max{|Θ|, |Γ|+ |∆|}. By the arbitrariness of σ, we obtain
PoA(G) =
F(σ)
F(σ∗(G))
≤ |Γ|+ |∆|+ |Θ|
max{|Θ|, |Γ|+ |∆|} ≤ 2.
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